There is much relief as quiet finally returns to Pathankot. However, the
immediate questions that need to be asked are about the way the
security operation was carried out from the moment a specific
intelligence alert came to the Centre about the possible targeting of
the Pathankot airbase. This newspaper has already reported that by Christmas,
a foreign intelligence agency had passed on a tip-off about terrorists
planning to attack the base. Was that not treated with seriousness
because most intelligence alerts do not mean anything? Is the response a
reflection of the poor quality of general intelligence alerts? On
January 1, early morning, the abducted Superintendent of Police,
Salwinder Singh, reported to the local police that his vehicle had been
snatched. By afternoon, the government at the Centre had confirmation about the presence of terrorists
in Pathankot. What the security establishment did from that moment
raises several questions. A meeting chaired by the National Security
Adviser and attended by, among others, the chiefs of the Army and the
Air Force, decided to rush NSG commandos from Delhi. How did they take
that decision, when it was clear that an airbase had to be protected and
terrorists could be anywhere in the district? Does this reflect the
poor thinking of senior members of the security establishment? Or does
it hint at autocratic decision-making in New Delhi without professional
participation?
Over the last few days, the government has been making a desperate
effort to defend the course of action that was followed in fighting
terrorists. From informal briefings in New Delhi to the formal briefing
on Wednesday evening by Lt. Gen. K.J. Singh, General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, the government has been putting up
a spirited defence of the operations. Gen. Singh admitted that the
first to react to the terrorists were the DSC (Defence Security Corps)
and Garuds, but added that the second contact was the Army columns. As Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar did on Tuesday,
Gen. Singh claimed that there was total operational synergy, and he
justified the time taken by saying that forces had to be applied
sequentially, and not simultaneously, and they were also careful to
avoid a hostage situation and other eventualities. However, all this
does not answer the basic criticism by military veterans and security
experts: despite the Pathankot airbase being at shouting distance from
thousands of Army soldiers trained to deal with terrorists, why were
they not even called in to provide perimeter security to the base? What was the need to send the NSG into a military installation
where the Army’s para commandos and quick reaction teams would have
been more familiar with the terrain? Why was the operational command not
handed over to the senior-most Army commander on the ground? The
answers should not only inform decisions to hold those responsible
accountable for the mis-step in operations, but also lead to an upgrade
of existing protocols.
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